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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the rural-urban migration phenomena as it is usu-
ally observed in economies which are in the early stages of industrialization. The
analysis is conducted by means of a statistical mechanics approach which builds
a computational agent-based model. Agents are placed on a lattice and the con-
nections among them are described via an Ising like model. Simulations on this
computational model show some emergent properties that are common in develop-
ing economies, such as a transitional dynamics characterized by continuous growth
of urban population, followed by the equalization of expected wages between rural
and urban sectors (Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition), urban concentration and
increasing of per capita income.
1 Introduction
Economic development generates significant structural transformations, such as changes
in the demographic condition and the production structure. As mentioned in chapter 10
of ref. [1] the most important structural feature of developing economies is the distinction
between rural and urban sectors. The agriculture plays a key role in the development of
the urban sector of an economy: it provides both the food surplus that enables the urban
sector to survive, and the supply of labor to the expanding industrial urban sector. As
suggested in chapter 5 of ref. [2], the fundamental part of the transformation from mostly
dispersed rural and agrarian countries in a more concentrated urban and industrial is the
flux of a large number of individuals through migration from rural areas to urban areas.
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In this paper we examine the rural-urban migration phenomena which takes place
during the industrialization process. The analysis is carried out by using an agent-based
computational model which aims to describe some of the main structural features of a
developing economy. We look at the rural-urban migration as a discrete choice problem,
which allows us to formalize the migration process by using an Ising like model. We
modelled the migratory decision in the usual manner considering the force exerted by the
difference of earnings between the sectors. Moreover, it is also included a new factor, the
influence from neighbors like in the Ising model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic setting, i.e., the
typical dual economic structure (rural versus urban sector) in industrializing countries.
In section 3 the migration process is modelled within a statistical mechanics framework.
Section 4 presents the simulations and the main results. Finally, section 5 shows the
concluding remarks.
2 The Economic Setting
Let us consider an economic system formed by two sectors, one rural and the other urban.
The main differences between these sectors are the sort of goods they produce, the tech-
nologies used by firms and the framework of wage determination. Such a dual structure
is typically used by the economic literature which investigates the rural-urban migration
phenomena [1][3][4][5][6]. The basic features of the dual economy will be described in sub-
section 2.1 and 2.2. Subsection 2.3 shows how the equilibrium macrostate of the economic
system is determined.
2.1 The urban sector
The urban productive sector is formed by firms specialized in the production of manufac-
turated goods. The output of the ith firm Ymi depends positively on both the amount of
employed workers Nmi and the effort ε, spent by each worker to perform his job. Based
on the classical rural-urban migration theory [3][4], we assume that the stock of capital
during the analysis period is given. Supposing a standard geometrical functional form [7],
the production function of the manufacturing firm is the well-known Cobb-Douglas4
Ymi = Am (εNmi)
α , (1)
where 0 < α < 1 and Am > 0 are parametric constants.
By using the functional form originally suggested by Summers [8] and slightly modified
by Romer [9], the urban worker’s effort can be defined as a function of the real wage paid
by the manufacturing firm, the urban unemployment rate u and the alternative wage wm,
which is paid by other firms of the same sector. Then the effort function is given by
4The modelling of employment and wage determination of the urban sector is based on the efficiency-
wage approach. See chapter 10 of ref. [9] and section V of ref. [14] for further details.
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ε =
{ [
wmi−(1−bu)wm
(1−bu)wm
]η
, if wmi > (1− u)wm,
0, otherwise,
(2)
where 0 < η < 1 and b > 0 are parametric constants.
The Zm manufacturing firms which form the manufacturing sector seek to maximize
their real profits, measured in units of the manufacturated good, by choosing wages and
employment freely. Given eq. (1) and eq. (2) the real profit of ith manufacturing firm is
Am
[(
wmi − (1− bu)wm
(1− bu)wm
)η
Nmi
]α
− wmiNmi. (3)
The maximization condition of eq. (3) can be found using the first-order condition for
a maximum, which result is5
wmi =
(1− bu)wm
1− η
(4)
and
Nmi =
[
αAmη
αη(1− η)1−αη
(1− bu)wm
] 1
1−α
. (5)
In equilibrium, all these firms choose the same wage [8][9], i.e., wmi = wm (i =
1, 2, 3, ..., Zm). Then, from equation (4) the equilibrium urban unemployment rate is
u =
η
b
. (6)
By definition, the urban unemployment rate is the ratio between the number of unem-
ployed workers and the urban population (Nu − ZmNmi)/Nu, where Nu is the amount of
workers localized in the urban sector. The previous definition must be consistent in each
period to the equilibrium value of (6). The employment level of the manufacturing firm
which obeys this consistency condition is obtained equaling the equilibrium in eq. (6) to
the previous definition:
Nmi =
(
1−
η
b
) Nu
Zm
. (7)
Taking eq. (2), evaluated in the equilibrium, and eq. (7) and replace both in eq. (1),
the aggregated production of the manufacturing sector, ZmYmi, is given by
Ym = ξ1Nu
α, (8)
where ξ1 = AmZ
1−α
m
[(
η
1−η
)η (
1− η
b
)]α
.
By using eqs. (5), (6) and eq. (7) one can obtain the equilibrium wage of the manu-
facturing sector:
5The second-order condition for a maximum is also satisfied.
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wm = ξ2Nu
α−1, (9)
where ξ2 = αAm
(
η
1−η
)αη [(
1− η
b
)
1
Zm
]α−1
.
Given the parametric constants that specify the technology and the effort sensitivity
to wage, as well as the size of the manufacturing productive sector, it is possible to see
that the equilibrium of the urban sector depends directly upon the urban population Nu.
2.2 The rural sector
In the rural sector the farm i produces an agricultural output Yai by employing an amount
of workers Nai. The output is obtained by using a Cobb-Douglas production function [7]
Yai = Aa (Nai)
φ , (10)
where 0 < φ < 1 and Aa > 0 are parametric constants. We suppose that both the land
endowment and the stock of capital of the farm are given during the period of analysis as
assumed by refs. [3] and [7].
Differently from the urban sector, farms are price-takers and the real wage is adjusted
up to the point in which there is no unemployment in this sector [3][4]. This implies that
the rural population will match the aggregated employment in the rural sector. Therefore,
the equilibrium employment level of the farm i is
Nai =
N −Nu
Za
, (11)
where Za is the amount of farms which constitute the agricultural sector and N is the
total population of the economic system.
From eq. (10) and eq. (11) the aggregated production of the rural sector, ZaYai, is
Ya = ξ3 (N −Nu)
φ , (12)
where ξ3 = AaZ
1−φ
a .
Thus, the profit maximizing of the farms imply that the rural real wage expressed in
units of the manufactured good becomes equal to the marginal product of agricultural
labor in units of manufacturing good6:
wa = ξ4p (N −Nu)
φ , (13)
where ξ4 =
(
Aaφ/Z
φ−1
a
)
and p is the price of the agricultural good expressed in units of
the manufactured good.
Like in the urban sector, the equilibrium state of the rural sector depends on the urban
population, as the size of total population of the economy is fixed.
6This marginal product is the derivate of the production function, eq. (10), with respect to Nai
multiplied by p.
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2.3 The macrostate of economic system
As proposed by Harris and Todaro [3], the terms of trade between the rural and urban
sectors, measured by the price p, depend on the relative scarcity of agricultural and
manufacturated goods. This can be measured by the ratio Ym/Ya. The greater this
ratio the greater will be the scarcity of agricultural good, which implies an increase of
the agricultural good price in units of manufacturated good. Formally, given the urban
population, the equilibrium relative price of the agricultural good is7
p = ρ
(
Ym
Ya
)γ
(14)
where ρ > 0 and γ > 0 are parametric constants.
Therefore, given the size of urban population, by using equations (6-9) one can calcu-
late the state of urban sector. Likewise, the rural sector state is determined by means of
equations (11-14). The equilibrium state of both sectors will be modified if a migratory
flux changes the population distribution of the economic system.
3 Migratory process: a statistical mechanics approach
As argued by Harris and Todaro [3][4], individuals take their decisions of migrating or
not by considering the differential of expected wages between their present sector and
the sector they intend to go. However, other authors have taken into account additional
reasons. Based on the formalization from statistical mechanics applied to socioeconomic
phenomena [10][11], in this section we propose an agent-based computational model to
describe the rural-urban migratory process. This model is focused on the influence that
individuals suffer in the reference group that they are included. The emergent properties
will be analyzed taking into account the standard effect of labor allocation Harris-Todaro
mechanism, which is based on the expected differential wages between sectors. This
analysis will also be concerned on the effect of social neighborhood, often mentioned by
other authors but not yet formalized.
The main feature of the decision process is that each worker reviews his sectorial
location after a period of time spent in that sector. We exclude, by assumption, the
possibility that the worker may simultaneously supply his labor force to both sectors.
Thus, only two choices are admitted: stay in the sector in which he was during previous
periods or migrate.
In order to model the migration process by allowing only discrete choices, each worker
has its state defined by σi ∈ {−1,+1}, where σi = −1 means that the worker is at the
rural sector; otherwise, σi = +1, representing the urban sector.
In our model, during the decision process, explicit and observable incentives are taken
into account by each potential migrant. This is called a deterministic private utility
[10][11], given by
7In the literature on rural-urban migration it is usual, because of analytical simplicity, to consider p
constant [7]. This is true in the special case when γ = 0 in eq. (14).
5
Ui = H(t)σi, (15)
where H(t) = kωe, k > 0 is a parametric constant and ωe is the expected urban-rural
differential wage. The expected urban-rural wages in function of H(t) are specified as
follows.
Jobs are allocated at random when manufacturing firms are faced with more applicants
than jobs avaliable [3][5]. It means that in each time step all urban workers have the
same probability to find an urban job. Under such a hypothesis, the term (1 − u) is the
probability of an urban worker to obtain a job. Hence, (1− u)wm is the expected urban
wage. Assuming that the rural wage is perfectly flexible there is no unemployment in
the rural sector. Then, the probability to find a job in the rural sector is 1. Therefore,
the rural wage wa is the same as the expected wage in this sector. In sum, the expected
differential of wage between urban and rural sectors is
ωe = (1− u)wm − wa. (16)
Besides, the worker i is also under the influence of other workers, his social neighbor-
hood [12], denoted by ni. The measure of such influence, that is, the deterministic social
utility [10][11], is given by
Si = J
∑
j∈ni
σiσj , (17)
where J > 0 is a parametric constant. The term J represents the interaction weight which
relates the worker i’s choice to the neighbor j’s choice. This is assumed to be nonnegative,
by representing the hypothesis that the worker seeks to conform to the behavior of his
neighbors [11]. The interactions among neighbors are assessed in the workers’ nearest
neighbors or in the next nearest neighbors.
Then, following references [10] and [11], we assume that payoff of worker i, which is
his deterministic total (private and social) utility can be obtained replacing eq. (16) in
eq. (15) and summing with eq. (17):
Hi = k [(1− u)wm − wa] σi + J
∑
j∈ni
σiσj . (18)
Therefore, this system can be described by the well-known ferromagnetic Ising model,
in the presence of an external time-dependent magnetic field:
H = −H(t)
N∑
i=1
σi − J
∑
<ij>
σiσj . (19)
In each time step, each worker reviews his decision about the sectorial location with
probability a, called activity [13]. Then, there is a part of the population that reviews
their decisions and becomes potential migrants.
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The potential migrant i becomes an actual migrant depending on the comparison
between his deterministic total utility Hi and his non observable and idiosyncratic moti-
vations µi, called random private utility [11]. The term µi represents the net difference
between the random private utilities that the potential migrant assigns to the sector he
intends to move and his present sector.
In each period, if µi > Hi, the potential migrant i becomes an actual migrant; other-
wise, this does not happen. Supposing that µi is a random variable logistically distributed
[10][11], the probability that the potential migrant effectively migrates is given by a cu-
mulative distribution:
Pri =
1
1 + e−βHi
, (20)
where β > 0 is a parametric constant that in this context measures the heterogeneity
of workers concerning to the migration propensity. Equation (20) is a measure of the
probability that a worker i, who is reviewing his location strategy, stays in the sector that
he is localized at that time. The higher his deterministic total utility, eq. (18), the higher
the probability that no change will take place.
4 Simulation
To carry out the simulation of the economic system described in the previous sections,
each worker is placed in one of the sites of a square lattice. The state of each site (worker)
is set as mentioned before: σi = +1 for urban workers and σi = −1 for rural ones. It
is important to emphasize that the state of these sites represent the sectorial allocation
of each worker, i.e., whether an individual is suppling his labor force in the urban or
rural sector. It means that the coordinates of the lattice sites are not related to spatial
distribution of workers.
To set up the initial state of the system, all workers are randomly distributed in the
lattice. At time t = 0 there is the initial condition that 20% of the population is urban.
In other words, initially, 20% of the sites will be assigned with σi = +1 and the remaining
80%, σi = −1. The reason for this initial distribution is because these are the values
which have usually been observed in developing countries before the urbanization process
initiates.
The next step in the simulation is to calculate the equilibrium state variables of the
urban sector, by using eqs. (6-9), and of the rural sector by using eqs. (11-14). Since
the state variables of both sectors are known, it is necessary to define the amount of
workers that will review their sectorial location, i.e. those one who will become potential
migrants. To do this, it is assumed that the probability that a worker will become a
potential migrant is given by the activity a, as defined by Stauffer and Penna [13]. All
those selected as potential migrants will have their private utility calculated by eq. (18).
In order to conclude the reviewing process, the probability defined in eq. (20) is
assessed. Then, a random number rn ∈ [0, 1] is generated from an uniform distribution.
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Figure 1: Proportion of workers at urban sector as function of time for three different set
of parameters J and k. Circles: (J > 0, k > 0); Squares: (J = 0, k > 0); Crosses: (J > 0,
k = 0).
If rn > Pr, then the potential migrant becomes an actual migrant; otherwise, no change
takes place.
As soon as the potential migrants end their reviewing process, a new sectorial distri-
bution is obtained. Knowledge of the new urban population allows the macrostate of the
economic system to be reset. Therefore, the state variables of both sectors have to be
calculated again. The whole procedure described above will be repeated as many times
as we set in the simulation. The stopping criteria used by us is halting the simulation
some steps after the moment when the system reaches equilibrium.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of workers in the urban sector nu ≡
Nu
N
, from now on
called urban share, plotted in three different combination of the parameters J and k. It is
necessary to remind that the parameters J and k adjust the instensity of the deterministic
private utility, eq. (15), and deterministic social utility, eq. (17), respectively. From top
to bottom the set of parameters used in the plotting are (J > 0, k > 0), (J = 0, k > 0)
and (J > 0, k = 0).
Firstly, consider the case (J = 0, k > 0) plotted in Fig. 1. In this case, the review
conducted by the agents is guided only by the deterministic private utility, which in turn
depends on the expected urban-rural difference of wages. As in models of classical theory
of migration [3][4], when the expected urban wage is higher than the rural wage, it implies
in a continuous growth of the urban share, as well as a relatively fast convergence towards
the equilibrium.
Secondly, consider the case where both effects are taken into account, (J > 0, k > 0).
Like the previous case, the rural-urban migratory process occurs again, however, the sys-
tem reaches a higher value of the equilibrium urban share, though it takes more time for
such outcome. This difference is caused by the parameter J > 0, what means that the
influence of the social neighborhood is considered. To better understand this behavior,
it should be reminded that the process of sectorial position revision depends on the de-
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Figure 2: Rural share as function of per capita income in units of manufacturated good.
terministic private utility and the social private utility. Then, when J > 0 the influence
of social neighborhood is being exerted, i.e., each worker attempts to adjust his choice
according to the sectorial position of his neighbors. The existence of such an influence
causes two different effects during the process of convergence towards equilibrium. In the
first moment, when the neighborhood are mainly rural, the influence from neighbors slows
the rural-urban migratory flux, increasing the time necessary to reach equilibrium. In the
second moment, when the neighborhood become mainly urban, the influence reinforces
the attraction from the high expected urban wage, leading to higher equilibrium urban
share.
Finally, we consider the case (J > 0, k = 0), with only neighborhood effects shown. In
this case, the potential migrants consider only the sectorial position of the neighborhood
and do not take into account the expected differential of wages. The pure effect due
from neighborhood leads to the extinction of the urban sector. This is not an empirically
important case, as it has not been observed in developing economies.
In Figure 2, another important feature caused by the migratory dynamics is the ex-
pansion of per capita income (Ym+ pYa)/N . This result matches to the economic data in
which in countries with high per capita income the proportion of the population living in
rural area is low [1].
In the initial state of the system the configuration was randomly set with 20% of the
sites assigned σi = +1, urban workers, and the rest σi = −1, rural workers as shown in
Fig. 3a. The final state of the dynamics by using (J > 0, k > 0) can be visualized in
Figure 3b. Now the infinite cluster is formed by sites σi = +1 representing the urban
concentration caused by the migratory process. Several others clusters are formed by sites
σi = −1.
Figures 4 and 5 show the average magnetization m =
∑
σi/N and the expected wages
ratio re ≡ (1 − u)wm/wa, respectively. Both figures are plotted as function of the ratio
J/k (k kept constant) measuring the relative intensity between these parameters.
Figure 4 has plotted in its vertical axis the average magnetization calculated during a
9
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Distribution of workers in the lattice. Black clusters represent urban workers
(σi = +1) and white clusters are rural workers (σi = −1). Fig. (a) is the random
distribution in the initial state of the system. Fig. (b) is the equilibrium distribution
where clusters due the sectorial neighborhood can be seen.
period after the system have reached equilibrium. To values of J/k less than the critical
threshold the net magnetization is m ∼= 0.4 representing an urban share about nu = 0.70.
By increasing the ratio J/k after this critical threshold the system goes to a new regime,
changing completely its net magnetization.
Figure 5 is a plotting of expected wage ratio as function of J/k. To values J/k .
9.0 the ration is re ∼= 1.0, what indicates that the expected urban wage and the rural
wage converge to the same value. This property is known as Harris-Todaro equilibrium
condition [3][1][5]. Hence, in a economic system where internal migration occurs freely the
absolute difference between the rural and urban wages can persist if workers consider the
possibility of unemployment. After the threshold J/k > 9.0, re has its maximum value
around 2.8 which shows that the urban expected wage is 2.8 times greater than the rural
wage. Even having this ratio increasing the value of the worker private utility, eq. (15),
the equilibrium of the system is m ∼= −0.29, i.e., a rural concentration of 64.9%. The
explanation of this outcome is that after a given threshold the values of J are in such a
range that the social utility, eq. (17), is many times higher than the private utility. In
other words, in such range, it does not matter if the expected wage is attractive in the
urban sector because the strongest factor in the migration decision is the influence of the
neighborhood, i.e., agents tend to mimic the behavior of other agents.
Simulations plotted in Figure 6 indicate that when the size N of the lattice increases
the equilibrium urban share nu will change. For a given heterogeneity of the agents β,
there is a power law relating equilibrium urban share and the inverse of lattice size. This
can be formalized in the expression below
10
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Figure 5: Expected wages ratio re as function of ratio J/k.
nu = A
(
1
N
)θ
, (21)
where A and θ are constants which have to be estimated. To carry out the estimation of
these constants we evaluated a linear regression of the log-linear version of eq. (21). In
Table 1 one can find the estimation of the constants A and θ based on data generated for
five different values of β.
The estimation of the constants are approximately the same when using slightly dif-
ferent values of agent heterogeneity β. For example, by using any pair of constants A and
θ from Table 1, the estimation of equilibrium urban share by eq. (21) is nu = 0.61 for an
economy with 50 million of workers.
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Figure 6: Log-log plot of equilibrium urban share nu as function of the inverse of popu-
lation size 1/N .
β A θ
1.5 1.064 0.032
2.0 1.061 0.031
2.5 1.061 0.031
3.0 1.064 0.032
3.5 1.066 0.032
Table 1. Estimates of parameters A and θ for different values of β.
The effects of the ratio J/k, together with size of population N = L2, are shown in
Fig. 7. The different values of equilibrium urban share are plotted in a grey scale. The
first property observed in this figure is the existence of several phase states which depend
on the values of J/k and N . Each phase state is characterized by a constant equilibrium
urban share. The topology of Figure 7 is in agreement with the results shown in Figs.
4 and 6, demonstrating that the properties of equilibrium macrostate depends on the
combination of these parameters.
In Figure 8 is plotted the equilibrium urban share as function of the parameter β. For
values of β tending to zero the equilibrium urban share tends to 0.5 (or m = 0), which
implies in a null urban concentration (null average magnetization), even though there is an
expected urban wage higher than the rural wage. In fact, eq. (20) shows that the smaller β
the higher the idiosyncratic and non-observed proportion of the worker’s behavior related
to the migration propensity. If β = 0, the choices σi = +1 and σi = −1 have the same
probability to occur being independent of the expected differential of wages. In sum, when
the heterogeneity of the workers related to the decision of migration increases, the urban
concentration will decline in the long run. On the other hand, when the heterogeneity
of the agents decreases, i.e., β increases, the equilibrium urban share is invariable after a
threshold.
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Figure 7: Urban share nu as function of the ratio J/k and the square lattice size L.
Lighter areas correspond to higher nu and darker areas to lower nu.
The decision of migration is not taken simultaneously by all individuals. In order to
simulate this behavior, the parameter called activity a is used. It gives the probability
that a worker will review the decision about his sectorial location. More specifically, a
represents the fraction of the population which will go through the reviewing process.
This fraction of individuals is randomly selected and changes in each time step. In Fig. 9
variation of a in different simulations shows that the time needed for the system to reach
equilibrium is proportionally inverse to the value of the activity. Therefore, the time
needed to reach the equilibrium state is strongly related to the amount of individuals
which review their sectorial decision.
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Figure 9: Time to reach equilibrium as function of activity parameter a.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an agent-based computational model to analyse the rural-urban
migration phenomena. The basic scenario was made of an economic system formed by two
sectors, rural and urban, which differed in term of the goods produced, the production
technology and the mechanism of wage determination.
By assuming the sectorial migration decision as discrete choice in a milieu of de-
centralized and non-coordinated decision-making, the rural-urban migration process was
formalized as an Ising like model. The simulations showed aggregate regularities which
indicates that decentralized migration decisions can lead to the emergence of equilibrium
macrostates with features observed in developing economies. First, the simulation hav-
ing an initial macrostate with population predominantly rural and expected urban wage
higher than rural wage provoked a transitional rural-urban migratory dynamics, with con-
tinuous growth of the urban share. This is a key feature of the phenomena called in ref.
14
[2] as urban transition.
Second, simulations also showed that, during the rural-urban migration process, the
reduction of the rural share takes place together with the increasing of per capita income
of the economy. Such an inverse relation between rural share and per capita income is
one of the most robust facts detected in economic statistics [1].
Third, the transitional rural-urban migratory dynamics converged towards an equilib-
rium macrostate. The features of this transitional dynamics and equilibrium are sensitive
to the relative weight between private and social effects (utilities) as well as the degree of
heterogeneity of agents concerning the migration propensity. When the social interaction
component is relatively stronger and below a critical threshold the transitional dynamics
towards equilibrium is delayed and reaches a higher equilibrium urban share. With a high
heterogeneity of agents, β → 0, this generates the end of the pulling force due the high
expected urban wage what makes the system to reach an equilibrium macrostate with an
urban share nu = 0.5. On the other hand, with a moderate heterogeneity of agents, β > 1,
the equilibrium urban shares will be set in a empirically reasonable range (nu ≥ 0.6).
The analysis shown in this paper suggests that a deeper investigation can still be
carried out, which adopt alternative hypothesis mainly regarding the private and social
utilities as well as other assumptions employed in our model.
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